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 TAX COSTS AND
CORPORATION DIVIDEND POLICY
Evidence from the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Acts
Scholes and Wolfson (1992) predict that following the 1986 Tax
Reform Act, the tax cost of the corporate form relative to that of the
partnership form (the incremental tax cost) increased significantly. This
study hypothesizes that since dividends represent a tax disadvantaged form
of income relative to capital gains, then in response to an increase in
incremental tax costs, corporations would decrease their dividend payout
ratios. The response is expected to be stronger for corporations owned by
shareholders with long investment horizons because the tax cost saved from
decreasing dividend payout ratios is an increasing function of sharehold-
ers’ investment horizon. The empirical tests support the hypothesis and
show a negative relationship between the change in incremental tax costs
and the change in dividend payout ratios for firms with long average
investment horizons.
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Introduction
This study examines the change in
dividend payout ratio across a sample of
NYSE/AMEX corporations in response to
the 1986 Tax Reform Act. It also investi-
gates whether the response depends on the
average holding period of corporations’
shareholders.
There are significant differences in
tax treatment across different legal organi-
zational forms. One important example is
the difference in the tax cost of corporate
and partnership form. Tax costs are de-
fined as the sum of the income taxes im-
posed on the organization and any taxes
imposed on the equity owners of the orga-
nization (Guenther 1992). Corporate in-
come attributable to stockholders is sub-
ject to double taxation. The tax costs con-
sist of the corporate income tax and the
shareholders’ tax on dividend income and
capital gains. On the other hand, partner-
ship income is subject to only one level of
taxation. The tax costs are the personal
taxes paid on the taxable income of the
partnership. However, despite their tax
disadvantages, corporations enjoy lower
transaction costs over partnership. The
lower transaction costs includes lower
operating costs, better access to capital
markets, and better control of manage-
ment (Scholes and Wolfson 1992).
According to Scholes and Wolfson
(1992), a firm chooses an organization’s
form to minimize both tax costs and trans-
action costs. When the corporate form has
a greater tax cost than the partnership, the
corporate form would only be chosen if
the transaction costs of the partnership
form exceed those of the corporate form.
A new tax rule may change the relative tax
costs of corporations over partnerships.
This change may result in firms’ conver-
sion in form. Absent this conversion, firms
may adopt new operational and/or finan-
cial policies that minimize tax costs and
transaction costs.
In line with this, Scholes and Wolfson
(1992: 68-69) predict that after the 1986
tax reform act (TRA), the tax cost of the
corporate form increases substantially rela-
tive to that of the partnership form. There
are two reasons for the increase:
1. The reduction of top personal tax rates
from 50 percent to 28 percent is larger
than the reduction of the top corporate
tax rate, which drops from 46 percent
to 34 percent.
2. The shareholder level tax on after-tax
corporate profits has increased sub-
stantially. This is due to the reduction
of the capital gains exclusion from 60
percent to 0 percent.
The prediction leads directly to the
question of responses of corporations to
the increasing tax costs. One response that
corporations can make is to alter their
dividend policy. A finding that there is a
change in dividend policy in response to
the increase in tax cost would provide
evidence of the relevance of dividend
policy on minimizing tax costs. Thus, this
study attempts to shed light on the rel-
evance of dividend policy by investigating
whether there is any systematic change in
dividend policy in reaction to the increase
in tax cost.
Since dividends represent a tax dis-
advantaged form of income relative to
capital gains, corporations are predicted to
respond to an increase in tax costs by
decreasing dividend payout ratios. The tax
cost saved from decreasing dividend
payout ratios is an increasing function of
shareholders’ investment horizons. There-
fore, the response is expected to be stron-
ger for corporations owned by sharehold-
ers with long investment horizons.
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This study is similar to a study by
Guenther (1992) that investigated the re-
sponse of corporations to the 1981 Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA).
Guenther asserts that ERTA caused an
increase in the tax costs of the corporate
form relative to those of the partnership
form. This study differs from Guenther
(1992) in that it examines the change in
dividend policy of corporations as a result
of the 1986 TRA. In addition, it demon-
strates that the change in dividend policy
depends on the investment horizon of cor-
porations’ shareholders.
Previous studies predict that the TRA
is likely to induce firms to raise their
dividend payout ratios. The reason is that
the TRA makes dividend income less
heavily taxed and equalizes the statutory
tax rates on dividends and capital gains.
Evidences of the impact of the 1986 TRA
on dividend policy have been mixed. Some
studies (Gordon and MacKie Mason
(1991), Papaioannou and Savarese (1994)
find that dividend payout ratios signifi-
cantly increase following the TRA, while
one study (Bolster and Janjigian 1991)
finds no significant difference between
the pre- and the post-TRA mean aggregate
dividend payout ratios for a large sample
of firms. The studies, however, do not
control the impact of the increase in tax
costs on dividend policy. This may bias
the results. This study differs from previ-
ous studies in that it takes into account the
impact of the increase in tax costs on
dividend policy.
To measure the relative tax cost of the
corporate form to that of the partnership
form (i.e., the incremental tax costs), this
study follows Guenther’s measurement of
incremental tax costs. Guenther employs
two measures of incremental tax costs. He
assumes either that capital gains tax can be
postponed indefinitely (the lower bound
measure) or that all capital gains are taxed
currently (the upper bound measure). This
study extends Guenther’s study by pro-
posing a measurement of incremental tax
costs that considers the length of holding
period in determining the present value of
the capital gains tax.
The results of this study show that
there is a negative relationship between
the change in incremental tax costs and the
change in dividend payout ratios. The re-
lationship is stronger for firms with longer
average investment horizons. In addition,
after controlling the effect of the change in
incremental tax costs and the pre-86 aver-
age payout ratios, the study finds that
corporations significantly increase their
payout ratios. Finally, the results of this
study show that the lower bound and the
upper bound incremental tax costs that are
used by Guenther are subject to measure-
ment bias.
The remainder of the study is orga-
nized as follows. The first section provides
literature review relevant to this study and
develops hypotheses dealing with the ob-
jectives of the study. The second section
presents the measurement of the variables
used in the empirical tests as well as the
sample selection procedure. The third sec-
tion reports the results of comparisons of
alternative incremental tax cost measures.
The fourth section provides the results of
testing the hypotheses and the last section
contains a conclusion. The appendix com-
pares alternative tax wedge measures.
Literature Review and Hypothesis
Development
Following is a summary of theories
of dividend policy that have been devel-
oped in the past. The Miller and Modigliani
(1961) paper proves the irrelevance of
dividend policy in a world where there are
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no taxes or transaction costs. Once corpo-
rate and personal income taxes are intro-
duced, the theory (e.g. Brennan 1970) sug-
gests that it would be optimal to pay no
dividends at all because of the tax disad-
vantage of dividends relative to capital
gains. Yet, contrary to the theory, corpora-
tions do pay dividends. The Barclay and
Smith (1995) paper suggests that there
appears to be strong cross-sectional regu-
larities in dividend payout. Accordingly,
there may be optimal dividend policies
that result from a trade-off between the
costs and benefits of paying dividends.
Copeland and Weston (1992) summarize
the possible cost and benefits of dividends
as follows. The possible costs includes (1)
the tax disadvantages of receiving income
in the form of dividends rather than capital
gains, (2) the cost of raising external capi-
tal if dividends are paid out, and (3) the
foregone use of funds for productive in-
vestment. The possible benefits are (1)
higher perceived corporate value because
of the signaling content of dividends, (2)
lower agency costs of external equity, and
(3) the ability of dividend payments to
help complete the markets. Thus, the tax
cost of dividends is only one consideration
in choosing a dividend policy.
With the enactment of the 1986 tax
reform act, the top personal tax rates were
reduced from 50 percent to 28 percent
while the top corporate tax rate dropped
from 46 percent to 34 percent. The capital
gains exclusion was also reduced from 60
percent to 0 percent. The TRA has direct
and indirect impact on corporate dividend
policy. The direct impact is through the
increased attractiveness of dividend rela-
tive to capital gain, while the indirect im-
pact is through the response of corpora-
tions to the increase in the incremental tax
cost after 1986.
Following the TRA, there is an in-
crease in the tax burden on capital gains
and the reduction in the tax burden on
dividend income. This makes dividends
more attractive as the source of income.
On the basis of this assertion, Ben-Horin,
Hocman and Palmon (1987) predict that
dividend payout ratios should increase in
the post-TRA period.
All previous studies only focus on the
direct impact of the TRA on dividend
policy. The studies predict that corporate
dividend payout ratios should increase in
response to the TRA. The results of the
studies have been mixed. Gordon and
Mackie-Mason (1990) uncover a substan-
tial increase in payouts from 1984 to 1988.
However, they employ aggregate data in
that the payout ratio is defined as the
aggregate dividends of corporations di-
vided by aggregate after tax profits of
corporations. The aggregate payout ratio,
therefore, is biased toward large corpora-
tions. Based on the mean and the median
aggregate dividend payout ratios, Bolster
and Janjigian (1991) find no evidence that
dividend payouts increase in response to
tax reform. Their results are consistent
with Abrutyn and Turner (1990) who find
that 85 percent of corporations surveyed
did not expect to change payouts in re-
sponse to the TRA.
Papaioannou and Savarese (1994)
employ a matched-pairs design to test
whether the pre-TRA average payout ra-
tios are significantly different from the
post-TRA average payout ratios. The test
indicates that there is no significant change
during the period. They then divide the
sample firms into five quintiles according
to their pre-TRA average dividend payout
ratios and repeat the matched-pairs t-tests
for each quintile. They find that firms with
low and medium payout ratios in the pre-
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TRA period increased their payout ratios
significantly after 1986 while firms in the
highest payout ratio group experience a
significant decline in their payout ratios.
They interpret the findings to be support-
ive of the prediction. Their findings, how-
ever, can also be interpreted as the reflec-
tion of mean reversion of dividend payout
ratios. Firms with low payout ratios tend to
increase their payout ratios since they have
capacity to do so while firms with high
payout ratios tend to decrease their high
ratios toward their lower long-term target
payout ratios.
The indirect impact of the TRA on
dividend policy is explained as follows.
Scholes and Wolfson (1992: 58) show
that, ignoring non-tax considerations and
assuming no dividend payment, a tax-
payer will be indifferent between a part-
nership and a corporation whenever the
following equation holds:
[1 + R(1-tp)]n = [1 + R(1-tc)]n (1-gtp) +
gtp..........................(1)
where,
R = the before tax return on investment,
tp = the personal tax rates,
t
c
= the corporate tax rate,
g = the capital gain inclusion rate on gains
from sale of shares and n is the time
period of the investment.
The left side of the equation is the
after-tax accumulation on an initial $1
investment for a partnership, and the right
side of the equation is that for a corpora-
tion. The incremental tax cost of the cor-
porate form over the partnership form is
greater than zero (i.e., the partnership is
preferred) if the after-tax accumulation for
a partnership is higher than that for a
corporation.
From Equation 1, after 1986 the part-
nership form dominates the corporate form
since tp < tc and g = 1. Even if corporations
can defer indefinitely the payment of the
capital gains tax (i.e., g = 0), partnerships
still dominate corporations for many prof-
itable firms as long as tp < tc. In conclusion,
if everything else remains constant (divi-
dends, earnings, etc.), on average, corpo-
rations should have experienced increased
incremental tax costs after 1986.
As a consequence of the 1986 Tax
Act, from a tax consideration, many cor-
porations would convert to the partnership
form. However, relatively few corpora-
tions changed to the partnership form,
both because of perceived non-tax advan-
tages of the corporate form and due to the
costs of converting from the corporate
form. Given this, corporations might be
expected to take certain actions that would
reduce the increase in their incremental
tax costs.
Consistent with the theory of the tax
disadvantage of dividends, one response
of corporations to increasing tax costs of
the corporate form is to decrease the divi-
dend payout ratio. By decreasing the divi-
dend payout ratio and increasing retained
earnings, corporations are able to post-
pone the personal taxes assessed on share-
holders because retained earnings are tax-
able only after they are realized by share-
holders. This would reduce the increase in
the relative tax costs of the corporate form.
Since there is a trade-off between the costs
and benefits of paying dividends, corpora-
tions would reduce the dividend payout
ratios to the point where the additional tax
savings equal the incremental cost of re-
ducing them. Thus, the indirect impact of
the TRA is that dividend payout ratios
should decrease in response to an increase
in tax costs.
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After 1986, with capital gains fully
taxable at ordinary rates, investors retain
the advantage only of the deferral of capi-
tal gain taxes for the length of the holding
period. Tax deferral becomes more valu-
able as the holding period of investors gets
longer. Accordingly, the tax costs saved
from decreasing dividend payments is an
increasing function of investors’ holding
periods. Therefore, the negative associa-
tion between the change in corporations’
relative tax costs and the change in their
dividend payout ratios is expected to be
stronger for corporations whose investors
have relatively long holding periods.1 Thus,
the negative association between the
change in the incremental tax cost and the
change in the dividend payout ratio is
stronger for corporations whose investors
have long holding periods.
There has been no study that investi-
gates the indirect impact of the 1986 TRA
on dividend policy. Guenther (1992) ex-
amines the effect of the 1981 individual
tax reductions on the incremental tax cost
of the corporate form. With ERTA, the
maximum tax rate on partnership form
decreased from 70 to 50 percent, while the
maximum corporate rate remained un-
changed. Therefore, corporations should
have experienced increased incremental
tax costs after 1981. The results of his tests
are consistent with this prediction. He also
finds that there is a negative correlation
between the change in the dividend payout
ratios and the change in the incremental
tax costs following ERTA.
The direct and indirect impacts of the
TRA on dividend policy generate conflict-
ing prediction. In combination, it may
appear that corporations’ dividend policy
does not respond to the TRA while it
actually does. This may also explain why
some studies do not find significant change
in dividend payout ratios after 1986. This
study attempts to investigate both direct
and indirect impacts of the TRA on divi-
dend policy. Hereafter, I label the predic-
tion of the direct impact of the TRA as the
direct impact hypothesis while the predic-
tion of the indirect impact of the TRA as
the indirect impact hypothesis.
Measurement of Variables and
Sample Selection
Measurement of Variables
The variables of the study are similar
to those of Guenther’s study (1992) with
some modifications. Guenther (1992) de-
fines incremental tax cost as the difference
between the tax cost of the corporate form
and the tax cost of the partnership form.
According to the definition, the incremen-
tal tax cost of the corporate form [i.e., tax
wedge (W)] is as follows:
W = TI(t
c
) - (TI - D)(tp) + UNI(gtp)
(1+i)n
........................................ (2)
tc, tp, and g are as defined previously
TI = the taxable income,
D = the amount paid as a dividend,
UNI = the undistributed net income,
i = the investor discount rate, and
n = the number of years that the inves-
tor holds the stock before the capi-
1
  As another response to the tax act, investors could change their holding periods. However, tax cost is only
one of many factors to consider in setting up investors’ investment strategies, and therefore, investors have to
take account these factors to evaluate the trade-off between the costs and benefits from changing their holding
periods. The focus of this paper is on the response of corporations and not the response of investors.
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tal gain is taxed (i.e., the invest-
ment horizon/holding period).
The equation states that the tax wedge
is equal to the corporation income tax
[TI(t
c
)], less the investors’ tax avoided on
undistributed taxable income [(TI - D)(tp)]
the present value of the capital gains tax
due upon a future sale of the shares
[UNI(gtp)/(1+i)n]. A positive tax wedge
implies that the tax cost of the corporate
form is higher than the tax cost of the
partnership form.
Guenther employs two measures of
tax wedges. The first measure, the lower
bound tax wedge, assumes that the capital
gains tax can be deferred indefinitely; there-
fore, the present value of the future tax is
close to zero and can be ignored [i.e.,
UNI(gtp)/(1+i)n = 0]. The second measure,
the upper bound tax wedge, assumes that
shareholders realize their capital gains in
the current year, so all capital gains are
taxed currently (i.e., n = 0).
The two measures are subject to sys-
tematic measurement bias. The lower
bound measure tends to understate the tax
wedge, while the upper bound measure
tends to overstate the tax wedge.2 Further-
more, the lower bound tax wedge does not
capture the effect of the elimination of the
capital gain inclusion rate (i.e., g increases
from 0.4 to 1) because the effect can be
captured only if the last term of Equation
2 does not equal zero. The effect of the
assumption is to understate the increase in
the tax wedge and bias the results against
finding a significant increase in the tax
wedge after 1986. The upper bound tax
wedge, on the other hand, tends to over-
state the increase in the tax wedge and to
bias the results for finding an increase in
the tax wedge after 1986.
To overcome the above limitations,
in addition to using the upper bound and
lower bound tax wedges, this study uses a
third tax wedge measure, the within bound
tax wedge, that captures shareholders’
average holding period (n) in the calcula-
tion of the tax wedge. To estimate the
average holding period (n) for a corpora-
tion, the study defines the average holding
period as the total outstanding shares of
the corporation divided by the total shares
traded in one year for that particular firm.3
The definition implies that higher market
liquidity is associated with a shorter in-
vestment horizon.
2
 The difference between the tax wedge in Equation (2) and the lower bound measure is the present value
of the future tax. The measure becomes more understated as net income(NI) is higher, the dividend is lower, the
discount rate is lower and the average holding period is shorter. The difference between the upper bound measure
and the tax wedge in Equation (2) follows:
(gtp)(NI-D) - (gtp)(NI-D) ………………...... (3)
(1+i)n
= (gtp)(NI-D)[(1+i)n- 1] ……………….......... (4)
(1+i)n
where NI is net income.
The upper bound measure becomes more overstated as net income is higher, the dividend is lower, the discount
rate is higher, and the average holding period is longer.
3
  For example, if a corporation has 1000 shares outstanding in a certain year and the shares trading volume
of that year is 200 shares, then the average holding period of shareholders of the corporation for that year is
estimated to be 5 year.
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Throughout the balance of the paper,
the lower bound, upper bound and within
bound tax wedges are referred to LOWER
WEDGE, UPPER WEDGE, and WITHIN
WEDGE respectively. The appendix com-
pares these three measures of incremental
tax costs.
The study adopts the definitions of
taxable income and tax liability that are
used by Stickney and McGee (1981) in
which the corporation income tax includes
federal, foreign and state taxes. Tax liabil-
ity is calculated as total tax expense minus
the deferred tax expense reported on the
income statement. The taxable income is
defined as the pretax book income minus
the deferred tax expense reported on the
income statement.
The investor tax rate (tp) is defined
consistent with Guenther. The method
calculates a weighted average investor
marginal tax rate assuming that the com-
position of investor groups does not differ
across firms. The source of information is
from the Internal Revenue Service publi-
cation Statistics of Income. Table 1 pro-
vides the weighted average marginal tax
rates for each year from 1984 through
1989.4  •The undistributed net income (UNI)
is defined as the difference between net
income and dividend.5
The discount factor, or the cost of
equity (i) is estimated using the capital
asset pricing model:
ii = rf + b(rm - rf) …………......(5)
where
ii = the cost of equity for firm i,
rf = the risk free rate,
r
m
= the required market rate of return and
bi is beta for firm i.
Consistent with other studies, the
average rate on long-term Treasury bonds
is used as the proxy for the risk free rate.
The study uses the yield on a 10-year T-
bond and the rates are taken from the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
The market risk premium (r
m
 - rf) is
estimated based on ex post, or historical
returns. The most thorough and widely
publicized ex post risk premium study is
conducted annually by Ibbotson Associ-
ates, who examine market data over long
periods of time to find the average annual
rates of return on stocks, T-bills, T-bonds,
and a set of high-grade corporate bonds.
The study uses Ibbotson’s data and defines
the risk premium as the average premium
of stocks over T-bonds. The data indicate
that over the 63-year period from 1926 to
1988, the average premium of stocks over
4
 The study employs multi-year period because the full effect of the tax law change on the response of
corporations is expected to span for several years. Except for the 1986 Tax Reform Act, during 1984-1989 there
was no major tax law change that might confound the test results.
5
 UNI can be negative, implying that capital losses occur. A negative UNI does not change the hypotheses
because corporations can still avoid personal taxes on dividends by decreasing dividend payout ratios. However,
from investors’ standpoint, it would be more tax advantageous to recognize the losses as they occur rather than
to postpone the realization of the losses. This is different from capital gains where it is more tax advantageous
to postpone the realization of the gains.
Table 1. Weighted Aveage Marginal
Tax Rates for Individuals Re-
ceiving Dividend Income
Year Tax Rate
1984 35.19%
1985 34.98%
1986 35.98%
1987 28.75%
1988 24.91%
1989 24.73%
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Table 2. Measurement of Variables
(Including COMPUSTAT Data Item Numbers)
Corporation Income Tax [TI (tc)]:
Total Tax Expense minus Deferred Tax Expense
(#16 - #50)
Taxable Income (TI):
Pretax Book Income minus (DTL/SMTR)
[#18 + #16 + #49 - (#50/SMTR)]
Dividend (D):
Cash Dividend (#21)
Undistributed Earnings (UNI) :
Net Income minus Dividend
(#18 + #49 + #50 - #21)
Average Holding Period (n):
Outstanding Shares / Shares Traded in one year
(#25 / #28)
Legend:
DTL = Deferred Tax Liability
SMTR = Statutory Marginal Tax Rate
1984-86 = 0.46; •1987 = 0.40; 1988-89 = 0.34
# = COMPUSTAT Data Item number
6 
 OTC firms are excluded from the sample corporations because the COMPUSTAT data for many of these
firms are incomplete and inaccurate.
T-bonds was 7.4 percent. Assuming that
the risk premium during 1984-1989 is the
same as the risk premium during 1926-
1988, the study uses 7.4 percent as the
estimated risk premium for 1984 to 1989.
Due to data limitations, beta is taken from
COMPUSTAT.
Consistent with previous studies, the
dividend payout ratio is calculated as the
sum of common dividends divided by the
net income. Table 2 presents the measure-
ments of the variables and their
COMPUSTAT data item numbers.
Sample Selection Procedure
The sample corporations are all New
York Stock Exchange and American Stock
Exchange COMPUSTAT corporations and
are not in the extractive industries, utili-
ties, financial institutions and insurance
SIC classifications.6  In addition, the sample
excludes firms meeting any one of follow-
ing criteria: (1) incorporation outside of
the United States; (2) other than a calendar
year end; (3) missing financial statement
information; and (4) having an average
dividend payout ratio greater than zero
over 1984-86.
Corporations in utilities, financial
institutions, insurance, and the extractive
industries are not used because of the
presence of unique tax rules available only
to those industries. The first criterion elimi-
nates firms that are domiciled abroad so
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Table 3. Sample Selection Statistics for he Sample of Corporations
a
 
Initial COMPUSTAT sample 2435
Less : Firms in the extractive industries, utilities,
financial institutions and insurance industry
classification 937
1498
Less : Firms with incorporations other than
the United States 94
1404
Less : Firms with other than a calendar year end 630
774
Less : Firms with missing information: 406
Final Sample Size : 368
a = Includes only firms from the COMPUSTAT on the New York Stock Exchange and
American Stock Exchange
more consistent and reliable estimates of
taxable income and corporate income tax
can be secured. The second criterion is
necessary since, as Guenther (1992: 28)
notes, “The equation for the tax wedge
assumes that dividends (paid) will be taxed
at the same marginal investor tax rate as
partnership income would be, and this
assumption will not hold for fiscal year
corporations if investor tax rates differ
across calendar years.” The last criteria is
needed because the indirect impact hy-
pothesis is applicable only for firms that
pay dividends before 1986.The effect of
each of the criteria on the sample size is
presented in Table 3.
Because of the apparent growth in
firm size over the sample period, and to
eliminate the effect of the growth from the
tax wedge measures, the tax wedge is
scaled by total sales.
Empirical Results
Univariate Test
This section investigates whether the
average tax wedge change is greater than
zero and whether the average change in
dividend payout ratio is significantly dif-
ferent from zero.
The study calculates the average tax
wedge (Wi*) for each sample corporation
i over two sub-periods, 1984-86 and 1987-
89 using three alternative tax wedge mea-
sures. To get the change in the tax wedge,
the difference between these two averages
is calculated for each sample corporation i
by subtracting Wi*1984-86 from Wi*1987-89.
Then the mean of these differences is
calculated.
The results of the test for the average
tax wedge change are shown in Table 4,
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7
  The sign test, however, indicates that the tax wedge change for LOWER WEDGE is greater than zero at
1 percent level. For 368 sample firms, 243 firms have tax wedge change greater than zero.
panel A. The average of the change in the
average tax wedges is significantly greater
than zero for WITHIN WEDGE and UP-
PER WEDGE, but it is not significant for
LOWER WEDGE.7 LOWER WEDGE pro-
vides the lowest mean or median and UP-
PER WEDGE generates the highest mean
or median, confirming the discussion in
Section III.1 (measurement of variables)
that they provide the lower bound and
upper bound of tax wedge change. The
findings generally confirm Scholes and
Wolfson (1992) prediction and indicate
that, on average, the 1986 tax law change
resulted in an increase in the tax cost of the
corporate form.
The average payout ratio is calcu-
lated for each sample corporation over two
sub-periods, 1984-86 and 1987-89.
DIVCHGi is the difference between these
two averages for each sample corporation
i. To control for extreme outliers that may
bias the results, I eliminate 10 percent of
firms with extreme low or high dividend
changes. These restrictions reduce the
sample size to 209 corporations.
The result of the univariate test is
reported in Table 4 panel B. The average
payout ratios have not significantly
changed over the period. The result is
consistent with the finding of Papaioannou
and Savarese (1994). The univariate test,
however, conceals the direct and the indi-
rect impact of the TRA as they may offset
each other.
Multivariate Test
This section investigates the change
in dividend payout ratio after controlling
for the effect of the tax wedge change. The
study employs six measures of tax wedge
change. The first three measures are the
original measures defined in Section III.1
(measurement of variables). The other three
measures are “as if” tax wedge changes
based on LOWER, WITHIN, and UPPER
WEDGE measures. The original tax
wedges are all calculated with the actual
data for each year in the sample period. If
firms decrease dividends in response to
higher tax costs, the effect of the response
on the tax wedge is a reduction in the
increase in the tax wedge caused by the tax
law change. This will reduce the associa-
tion between the responses and the in-
crease in the observed tax wedges. In order
Table 4. Univariate Test
Mean t-Stat p-Value Median
Panel A
LOWER WEDGE 368 0.0008 0.562 0.288 0.0031
WITHIN WEDGE 368 0.0033 2.74 0.0032 0.0042
UPPER WEDGE 368 0.0037 3.098 0.0011 0.0045
Panel B
DIVCHG 208 -0.0429 -2.683 0.004 -0.0116
P-values are based on one-tailed tests
Sample
Size
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to remove the effect of the responses, an
“as if” wedge is calculated for each firm in
the sample for the years 1987-1989. In
general, the “as if” tax wedge is calculated
by assuming that the response variable
being investigated remained at its average
1984-86 after 1986.
The “as if” dividend payout ratio is
calculated by assuming that each firm’s
dividend payout ratio for 1987-1989 is
equal to the firm’s mean dividend payout
ratio for 1984-1986. This “as if” dividend
payout ratio is multiplied by the taxable
income for each year of 1987-1989 to
arrive at an “as if” dividend amount for the
same years. The “as if” dividend amount is
then used in the tax wedge calculation.
The measure of “as if” tax wedge as de-
fined above, together with the ordinary tax
wedge, is used to measure the change in
tax wedge.
The following regression model
(Model 1) is used to test the hypotheses:
DIVCHGi = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi +
b2 AVGPAYi + ei…(6)
where,
i = for the ith firm,
PAYCHG = the change in the
dividend payout ratio,
WEDGECHG= the “as if” tax wedge
change or the tax wedge
change,
AVGPAY = the average dividend
payout ratio1984-86, and e
is the residual term.
The average dividend payout ratio is
used to control for the dividend capacity of
a firm. Firms that have high payout ratios
are more likely to reach their capacity to
pay dividends and therefore cannot sub-
stantially increase their payout ratios.
Hence, its coefficient is expected to be
negative.
The model is run using the original
tax wedge measures and the “as if” tax
wedge measures. Since the regression re-
sults are similar across tax wedge mea-
sures, only the results for the “as if” tax
wedge using WITHIN WEDGE are re-
ported. Generally, the results using the
original tax wedge measure are statisti-
cally not as strong as the results using “as
if” measures. This confirms the previous
assertion that the use of the original tax
wedge measure reduces the association
Table 5. Regression Results
Model : IVCHGI = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi + b2 AVGPAYi + ei
(Sample size = 203)
Regressors t-statistics
Intercept 0.083 3.209 2.808
WEDGECHG -2.946 -3.637 -3.43
AVGPAY -0.356 -4.33 -2.667
Adjusted R-SQUARE 0.1582
The significance level is based on one-tailed test.
All coefficients are significant at 1% level
Parameter White
Estimate t-statistic
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between the dividend change and the in-
crease in the observed tax wedges.
Table 5 presents the regression re-
sults, together with the ordinary t-tests and
White t-statistics that correct for
heteroscedasticity.8  The result for “as if”
WITHIN WEDGE tax wedge measures
show that the coefficient for tax wedges
change is significantly negative. This veri-
fies that there is significant negative rela-
tion between the change in tax wedge and
the change in the dividend payout ratio,
confirming the indirect impact hypothesis
that corporations decrease their dividend
payout more when the tax wedge changes
are higher.
As expected, the coefficient for
AVGPAY is significantly negative, indi-
cating that higher dividend payout firms
generate lower increase in dividend payout
ratios over the period.
The intercept is substantially greater
than zero, which means that if firms did
not experience an increase in tax cost and
their payout ratios were close to zero, they
would increase their payout ratios. There
can be two interpretations for this. The
first interpretation is that, in absence of
the increase in tax costs, firms that have
not paid dividends in the past are more
likely to increase dividends in the future.
The second interpretation relates to the
direct impact hypothesis, which concerns
with the elimination of the capital gain tax
exclusion after 1986.
Before the 1986 tax act, relative to
dividends, capital gains represented a tax
advantaged form of distributing earnings
because: (1) as opposed to fully taxable
dividends, the 60 percent capital gain tax
exclusion rate made capital gains only
partially taxable, and (2) capital gains were
subject to tax only when the gains were
realized. Absent non-tax costs, firms would
have saved some tax costs by eliminating
dividend payments. Since most firms do
pay dividends, the non-tax advantages of
dividends must outweigh their tax disad-
vantages.
After 1986, the tax advantage of capi-
tal gains was significantly reduced be-
cause the capital gain tax exclusion was
eliminated. The only tax advantage of capi-
tal gains is its value of deferral. Assuming
non-tax costs of dividends before and after
the act remain constant, and absent an
increase in the tax wedge (i.e., tax wedge
change= 0), the reduction in the capital
gain tax advantage would encourage cor-
porations to increase their dividend payout
ratio. This results in the intercept being
greater than zero, supporting the direct
impact hypothesis.
Further evidence of the direct impact
hypothesis is as follows. Firms with aver-
age holding periods close to zero would
most likely increase their payout ratios
because there would be no more tax ad-
vantage gained from retaining earnings.
Firms with longer holding periods would
still have some tax advantages in the form
of deferral. Those firms may decrease or
increase their payout ratios depending on
the relative tax value of deferral versus the
non-tax advantages of dividends. As the
average holding period of shareholders
gets longer, tax deferral becomes more
valuable and the firm is less likely to
8
  The model and other models in equation 6, 7, 8, and 9 are tested for possible heteroscedasticity in the
disturbance term using White’s general test. The tests for all models conclude that heteroscedasticity persists in
all models. To correct for the heteroscedasticity, besides providing the results using ordinary t-statistics or F-
statistics, and as suggested by White (1980), I compute the White estimator for the variance matrix of the least
squares estimators to arrive at White t-statistics. White shows that the White estimator provides a consistent
estimator of the variance matrix that is corrected for heteroscedasticity.
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increase its dividend payout ratio. There-
fore, in the absence of the increase in the
tax wedge, as the average holding period
of investors (AVHOLD) gets longer, the
increase in the dividend payout ratio will
be lower.9
Further evidence on the indirect im-
pact hypothesis is as follows. The hypoth-
esis suggests that the extent of the relation-
ship between DIVCHG and WEDGECHG
depends on the average holding period of
shareholders. By reducing dividend pay-
ment, firms whose average shareholders
have long holding periods save more tax
than firms with shareholders having short
holding period. Thus, firms with long hold-
ing period should have stronger negative
associations between DIVCHG and
WEDGECHG than firms with short hold-
ing periods.
To investigate these hypotheses, I
divide the sample into three sub-samples
based on the average holding period over
1984-86. The top quartile contains firms
with relatively long holding periods, the
next two middle quartiles are grouped as
firms with medium-term holding periods,
and the bottom quartile contains firms
with short holding periods. Then I run a
regression of the following model (model
2):
DIVCHGi = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi +
b2 AVGPAYi +
b3 LONGi +
b4 MEDIUMi +
b5 WEDLONGi +
b6 WEDMEDIUMi +
b7 PAYLONGi +
b8 PAYMEDIUMi +
ei……………......... (7)
where DIVCHG, WEDGECHG, AVGPAY
and e are as previously defined;
LONGi = 1 if AVHOLDi is in
the top quartile,
= 0 else;
MEDIUMi = 1 if AVHOLDi is in
the next second and
third quartiles;
= 0 else;
WEDLONGi = WEDGECHGi x
LONGi;
WEDMEDIUMi = WEDCHGi x
MEDIUMi;
PAYLONGi = AVGPAYi x LONGi;
PAYMEDIUMi = AVGPAYi x
MEDIUMi.
If, in absence of the increase in tax
cost, the direct impact hypothesis holds,
then b0 is expected to be positive while b3
and
 
b4 are negative. b3 is expected to be
more negative than b4 since it involves a
longer holding period. If the significance
of intercept in regression model 1 has
nothing to do with the elimination of capi-
tal gain exclusion rate, then b3 and b4
would not be significantly different from
zero.
If the indirect impact hypothesis
holds, then b5 and b6 are expected to be
negative, where b5 is more negative than
b6. PAYLONG and PAYMEDIUM are in-
cluded to control for the possible variation
in the relation between AVGPAY and
DIVCHG across different holding peri-
ods.
Table 6 Panel A reports the results of
the regression while Panel B presents the
results of the relevant tests that are not
reported in Panel A. The intercept is sig-
nificantly positive, indicating that, in the
absence of an increase in tax costs, firms
9
 As the average holding period gets longer, the increase in the present value of tax deferral is not constant
but is becoming smaller. This implies that the relationship between the average holding period and dividend
payout may be quadratic and has a half U shape.
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Parameter
Estimate
White
t-statistics
t-statisticsRegressors
Table 6. Regression Results
Model: DIVCHGI = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi + b2 AVGPAYi + b3 LONGi + b4
MEDIUMi + b5 WEDLONGi +
b6 WEDMEDIUMi + b7 PAYLONGi +
b8 PAYMEDIUMi + ei
(Sample size = 203)
PANEL A
Intercept 0.14 3.186 *** 4.17 ***
WEDGECHG -0.289 -0.241 n.s -0.335 n.s
AVGPAY -0.778 -5.875 *** -6.812 ***
LONG -0.132 -1.954 ** -1.715 **
MEDIUM -0.061 -1.065 n.s -1.317 *
WEDLONG -6.918 -3.224 *** -2.915 ***
WEDMEDIUM -2.719 -1.575 * -1.686 **
PAYLONG 0.863 4.277 *** 3.193 ***
PAYMEDIUM 0.474 2.595 *** 2.496 ***
Adjusted R-SQUARE 0.242  
The significance level is based on one-tailed test.
n.s = not significant at 10% level; * = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level;
*** = significant at 1% level
PANEL B
F Value Chisq Value
A.Direct Impact Hypothesis
a. Ho:b3=b4 1.186 n.s 0.805 n.s
Ha:b3<b4
B. Indirect Impact Hypothesis
a. Ho:b5=b6 3.574 ** 2.613 *
Ha:b5<b6
The F tests use the ordinary variance covariance matrix while the Chi-square tests
use the White corrected variance covariance matrix
n.s = not significant at 1% level; * = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level;
*** = significant at 1% level
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with short holding periods would increase
their payout ratios. b3 is significantly nega-
tive at 5 percent critical level. On the basis
of the ordinary t-test, b4 is not significant
while based on White corrected t-statistic,
it is marginally significant (0.05<p<0.1).
These results are consistent with the direct
impact hypothesis and suggest that, absent
an increase in the tax wedge, firms with
medium or long holding periods do not
increase their payout ratios as much as
firms with short holding periods. How-
ever, Panel B shows that, although b3 is
less than b4, it is not statistically more
negative than b4. This result is not consis-
tent with the direct impact hypothesis. In
summary, the tests indicate a marginal
support for the direct impact hypothesis.
b1 is not significantly less than zero.
This confirms the hypothesis that for firms
that have short holding periods, there is
not much tax that can be saved from de-
creasing payout ratios, and thus, there is
weak relation between DIVCHG and
WEDGECHG. b5 is significantly nega-
tive, indicating that for firms with long
holding periods, the negative association
between DIVCHG and tax wedge change
is stronger than for firms with short hold-
ing periods. Although b6 is negative at 5
percent level, it is significantly less nega-
tive than b5 (Table 6 Panel B). For firms
with medium holding periods, the nega-
tive association between DIVCHG and tax
wedge change is stronger than for firms
with short holding periods but not as strong
as firms with long holding periods. These
results strongly support the indirect im-
pact hypothesis. Firms with long holding
periods have stronger negative associa-
tions between DIVCHG and WEDGECHG
than firms with short holding periods or
firms with medium holding periods.10
10 
 Model 2 treats AVHOLD as a categorical variable. It assumes that the relationship between DIVCHG and
WEDGECHG is the same within each group. To examine the sensitivity of the results to the classification in
model 2, the following tests consider AVHOLD as a continuous variable. Footnote 12 indicates that the
relationship between AVHOLD and DIVCHG may not be linear. To investigate this, I run the following
regressions:
Model 3:
DIVCHGi = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi + b2 AVGPAYi + b3 AVHOLDi + b4 WEDHOLDi +
b5 PAYHOLDi + ei.......................................................................................................... (8)
Model 4:
DIVCHGi = b0 + b1 WEDGECHGi + b2 AVGPAYi + b3 AVHOLDi + b4 AVHOLD2i +
b5 WEDHOLDi + b6 PAYHOLDi + ei..................................................................................................    (9)
where
DIVCHG, WEDGECHG, AVGPAY, AVHOLD and e are as previously defined;
WEDHOLDi = WEDGECHGi x AVHOLDi
PAYHOLDi = AVGPAYi x AVHOLDi
AVHOLD2i = AVHOLDi x AVHOLDi
If the relation between AVHOLD and DIVCHG is linear, then Model 3 holds and b3 and b4 are expected to
be negative. For Model 4, b3 and b4 are expected to be negative and positive respectively since the relation
between DIVCHG and AVHOLD is expected to be quadratically negative. B5 is expected to be negative.
Generally, the results are consistent with the results for model 2. Consistent with the indirect impact
hypothesis, the coefficients for WEDHOLD in both models are significantly negative at 5 percent. In model 3,
b3 is not significantly less than zero while in model 4, as expected, b3 and b4 are significantly negative and positive
at 5 percent critical level. Thus, it appears that the relation between DIVCHG and AVHOLD is negative but it
is not linear, confirming the assertion made in footnote 12 and supporting the direct impact hypothesis.
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Conclusion
The study conducts empirical tests of
the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on
the change in dividend payout ratios of
corporations. The results of the tests are
consistent with Scholes and Wolfson’s
assertion that corporations have experi-
enced increased incremental tax costs rela-
tive to partnerships after 1986.
The study empirically shows that there
is an inverse relationship between the
change in tax wedge and the change in
dividend payout ratios. The degree of the
relationship is stronger for firms with
longer average holding periods. In addi-
tion, dividend payout ratios tend to in-
crease for firms that do not experience an
increase in incremental tax costs and have
low payout ratios. There is some evidence
that the increase in dividend payout ratios
is strongest for firms with short average
holding period. These firms increased their
payout ratios because there is no more tax
advantage from withholding earnings.
Lastly, the study reveals that the lower
bound and the upper bound tax wedges are
subject to measurement bias. The lower
bound tax wedge tends to understate the
increase of the tax wedge while the oppo-
site conclusion holds for the upper bound
tax wedge.
The results seem to have several con-
tributions to researchers. First, since the
findings indicate that corporations act to
minimize the tax that shareholders paid on
dividends, they support the tax disadvan-
tage theory of dividends and show that
dividend policies are relevant for mini-
mizing organizational costs. Second, the
finding that the relation between the change
in dividend payout and the change in tax
wedge depends on the investment horizon
of shareholders implies that corporations
do act in the interest of their shareholders.
Third, the results provide empirical evi-
dence for predictions by Scholes and
Wolfson regarding the increase in relative
tax costs after the 1986 tax reform act.
Fourth, the study provides alternative
measurement of the incremental tax costs.
The following are some extensions
for future research. First, the study only
examines the impact of the tax change on
dividend policies of corporations. Stron-
ger evidence may result if the study simul-
taneously examines alternative responses
of firms to the tax law change. The re-
sponses include the change in financial
leverage and non-dividend distributions.
It would also be interesting to investigate
whether these responses are a function of
investment horizon. Second, the model
uses the same personal tax rate for all
firms; therefore, it assumes that there is no
tax clientele of investors. As an extension
of the study, the same model can be ap-
plied with the exception that it incorpo-
rates different personal tax rates across
firms.
APPENDIX: Comparisons of
Alternative Tax Wedge
Measures
In Section III.1, I assert that LOWER
WEDGE (UPPER WEDGE) tends to un-
derstate (overstate) the level of and the
increase in tax wedge. On the basis of this
assertion, this section investigates whether
the level of tax wedge and tax wedge
change measured by LOWER WEDGE
(UPPER WEDGE) are significantly lower
(higher) than those measured by WITHIN
WEDGE. It also examines whether the
alternative measures are highly correlated.
The study calculates the average tax
wedge (Wi*) for each sample corporation
i over two sub-periods, 1984-86 and 1987-
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Table 7. Rank Order and Product Moment Correlations Between Tax Wedge
Measures
(Sample, n = 368)
Panel A : 1984-1986
Tax Wedge Measure LOWER WITHIN UPPER
LOWER 1.0000 0.9368 0.8908
WITHIN 0.9312 1.0000 0.9667
UPPER 0.8772 0.9609 1.0000
Panel B : 1987-1989
LOWER 1.0000 0.6610 0.5534
WITHIN 0.7734 1.0000 0.9692
UPPER 0.6278 0.9426 1.0000
Panel C : Tax Wedge Change
LOWER 1.0000 0.8364 0.7637
WITHIN 0.8204 1.0000 0.9650
UPPER 0.7039 0.9223 1.0000
Pearson correlation coefficients are in the upper diagonal and spearman correlation coefficients are
in the lower diagonal. All correlation coefficients are significant at 1 percent level.
The reason for high correlation between
the measures is that the average holding
period of investors is relatively short. The
median of the average holding period over
1984-1989 ranges from 1.6 to 2.5 years.
As expected, the results show a relatively
low degree of correlation between LOWER
WEDGE and UPPER WEDGE. The cor-
relation between LOWER WEDGE and
UPPER WEDGE and between LOWER
WEDGE and WITHIN WEDGE for Wi*1987-
89 are lower than those for Wi*1984-86. After
1986, the capital gain inclusion rate was
eliminated (i.e., g increases from 0.4 to 1).
The lower bound tax wedge does not cap-
ture the effect of the elimination. This
reduces the correlation between LOWER
89 using three alternative tax wedge mea-
sures. To get the change in the tax wedge,
the difference between these two averages
is calculated for each sample corporation i
by subtracting Wi*1984-86 from Wi*1987-89.
Then the mean of these differences is
calculated.
Spearman rank order and Pearson
product moment correlation between mea-
sures for Wi*1984-86, Wi*1987-89, and the change
in the tax wedge are presented in Table 7
for the total sample. The correlation coef-
ficients for Wi*1984-86, Wi*1987-89, and the
change in the tax wedge show similar
results. A comparison of UPPER and
WITHIN WEDGE shows the highest rank
order and Pearson correlation coefficients.
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WEDGE and the two other tax wedge
measures.
 Table 8 presents the results of paired
t-tests between the alternative tax wedge
measures. For each sample firm, the dif-
ference between two measures is calcu-
lated for Wi*1984-86, Wi*1987-89, and the tax
wedge change. Next, the means of the
differences are computed and the null hy-
potheses are the mean differences equal
zero. As expected, the results show that
LOWER WEDGE is significantly lower
than both UPPER and WITHIN WEDGE
for Wi*1984-866, Wi*1987-899, and the tax wedge
change. Thus, the results are consistent
with the assertion that LOWER WEDGE
provides a lower bound for the level of tax
wedge and the change in tax wedge. For
Table 8. Paired t-tests for Tax Wedge Measures
Mean t-stat p-value
Panel A : 1984-1986
UPPER - LOWER 0.00248 3.369 0.0004
UPPER - WITHIN 0.00134 4.619 0.0001
WITHIN - LOWER 0.00113 1.92 0.0278
Panel B : 1987-1989
UPPER - LOWER 0.00535 5.608 0.0001
UPPER - WITHIN 0.00169 5.788 0.0001
WITHIN - LOWER 0.00366 4.822 0.0001
Panel C : Tax Wedge Change
UPPER - LOWER 0.00287 3.058 0.0012
UPPER - WITHIN 0.00035 1.08 0.1404
WITHIN - LOWER 0.00253 3.18 0.0008
p-values are based on one-tailed tests
Wi*1984-86 and Wi*1987-899, UPPER WEDGE
is significantly higher than WITHIN
WEDGE, confirming the proposition that
UPPER WEDGE is an upper bound mea-
sure for the level of tax wedge. However,
for the tax wedge change, although the
sign is positive, UPPER WEDGE is not
significantly higher than WITHIN
WEDGE.11 The reason for the insignifi-
cance is that the average holding period of
investors is relatively short.
In summary, results of group com-
parison show that the correlation between
alternative measures is relatively high. The
paired t-tests show that, on average,
LOWER WEDGE is understated while
UPPER WEDGE is overstated.
11
 The sign test, however, indicates that UPPER WEDGE is significantly greater than WITHIN WEDGE.
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